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I. THIS COURT IS THE PROPER VENUE AND 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL OF A WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DECISION. 
II.STATUTES, RULES, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIE 
RELEVANT TO THIS CASE. 
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III.STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVENT TO ISSUES 
PRESENTED 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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STATUTES AND RULES 
§ 334 Effect of Pre-existing Condition 
§ 571 Hearsay; admissions & declarations 
§ 578 Hearsay Evidence 
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Rule 34A-2-601 page 7 
Rule 34A-2-802 page 8 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
l.The Appellate Court of the State of Utah is the 
Proper Court to hear the Appeal of a Worker's 
Compensation Decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The attorney for the Respondent lied in his brief to 
the Worker's Compensation hearing Judge (Traynor) by 
stating that the Petitioner had filed a subsequent 
Worker's Compensation claim with another employer for 
back and neck injuries. This alleged Worker's 
Compensation claim was supposed to have been filed 
several years after the injuries that are the basis for 
this claim. No such claim was ever filed by the 
Petitioner. The attorney had access to the records for 
Worker's Compensation claims and knew that no such 
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claim was on record. The attorney also attempted to 
show the hearing judge that the Petitioner had a "pre-
existing" condition. The attorney also presented a 
statement from a Doctor making a pronouncement that the 
injury in question should have ended on a specific 
date. 
The claims by the attorney for the Respondent fails in 
several ways. 
1. As a sworn officer of the court, it is a 
violation of his oath to present statement that he 
knows, or should have known, to be false, i.e False 
statement about a 2nd Worker's Compensation claim. 
2.Had there been a "pre-existing"" condition, it does 
not disqualify a claimants right to compensation. "A 
subsequent aggravation or "lighting up" of a previous 
injury sustained while in the employ of a previous 
employer is compensable if it is demonstrated that 
there was a causal relationship between the two. 
Makoff Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 23, 386 
P. 2d 70 (1962) 
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"A pre-existing disease or other disturbed condition or 
defect of the body, when aggravated or lighted up by an 
industrial accident, is compensable under the act. 
Jones v. California Packing Corp. , 121 Utah 612, 244 
P. 2d 649 (1952) 
3.The attorney for the Respondent did hire a Doctor 
to review all of the Petitioners records and make a 
prognosis of the Petitioners condition. This Doctor 
never examined the Petitioner. The Doctor was not 
available for cross-examination. The report submitted 
without unfairly prejudicing the Judge's opinion and 
by the Dr. was "hearsay evidence7' and not admissible 
violating the civil and legal rights of the Petitioner. 
4. When the Labor Commission appoints a medical 
examiner or panel to review a case, they require that 
the Dr. be subject to cross-examination or their 
report is not permitted. 
Rule 34A-2-601 (f,g,i) Medical Evaluations-Objections 
to Report. " (i) The written report of a medical panel, 
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medical director, or one or more medical consultants 
may be received as an exhibit at the hearing described 
in Subsection (2) (f). (ii) Notwithstanding Subsection 
(2) (g) (i)a report received as an exhibit may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as 
the report is sustained by the testimony admitted. 
It would stand to reason that if an unbiased, 
independent report that is ordered by the Labor 
Commission is required to have supporting testimony 
to be admitted, then a biased report submitted by 
the Respondent should be subject to the same standards. 
The Dr. was not available to give testimony. 
34A-2-802 Rules of Evidence and procedure before commission. 
Constitutional Rights of Parties The hearing judge 
did deny the Petitioner's objection to the submission 
of the biased Dr. report on the grounds of "hearsay 
evidence" and that the petitioner had the right to 
cross-examine the witness. The judge did state that 
this did not apply because it was too costly and time 
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consuming. "Commission, In exercising Its rights to 
proceed without certain formalities under this section, 
must not deprive any party of every fair means of 
eliciting facts to be finally determined nor 
unnecessarily limit cross-examination of witnesses." 
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Commfn. 
66 Utah 600, 245 P.343(1926)"Where the plaintiff filed 
written objections to the report of the medical panel 
and objected to the report at the hearing, the burden 
was on the commission or the employer to sustain It and 
this was not done, the report could not be considered 
as evidence." Hack ford v. Industrial Commfn, 11 Utah 2d 
312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961) "Hearsay evidence Is admissible 
In an administrative hearing before the commission, however, 
the commissions findings of fact cannot be based exclusively 
on hearsay evidence and there must be as residuum of 
evidence, legal and competent In a court of law, to 
support an award. Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial 
Comm'n 832 P2d.411 (Utah Ct. App.1992) 
Rushton v. Gelco Express & Employers Mutual Llab., 
8 
132 P. 2d 109 (Utah 1986) The commission must look at all 
relevant evidence in reaching its findings without being 
restricted to giving evidence from specific witnesses 
more weight than that from other witnesses. 
Again, the report submitted by the Respondent should be 
subject to the same standards as an unbiased report ordered 
by the commission. The Petitioner did object to the 
admission of the Respondents report at the beginning of 
the hearing. The judge did rely on this report as her 
decision gave the exact same date for terminating treatment 
as requested in the report by the Respondents. 
The Petitioner does submit that the admission of the Dr.'s 
report and the untruthful statement by the Respondents 
attorney did present enough weight as to compromise the 
rights of the petitioner. 
Judge Traynor was the administrative Judge that 
heard the case. It is with belief that she unfairly 
decided the case knowing that the evidence presented by 
the Respondents was neither based in law or reason. At 
the beginning of the hearing the Petitioner did object 
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1 • 'M . I . , - • Respondent 
in that it was "hearsay evidence" and th.- jt 
supported by testimony. The Petitioner was denied the 
right to cross-examine the testimony of the witness. 
r] lusion of » n, . ,aqe was in exact agreement wi 
the date of termination of treatment as reqilested by 
the medical report submitted b^ the Respondents. 
It is unreasonable to assume that her opinion could 
have cuiiH' .spontaneously to the same conclusion as the 
report , Th*1 evidence and statements :; i IIJITI i t tod were 
"hearsay" and not supported by case law. The judge knew 
or should have known that this was the case. The judge 
did fi nd that the first part of treatment was covered, 
the m i dd I o pa r\ of treatmer 1 t was don o *d, and the judge 
stated that if the Petitioner had surgery foi tlle cJaimed 
injuries, a claim could be submitted for that at a later 
date. 
"Commission, in exercisii.-. ights to proceed without 
certain formalities under - ^oczioi ' ' u ; ve 
any party of every fair means of eliciting facts to be 
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finally determined nor unnecessarily limit cross-examination 
of witnesses. " Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 66 Utah 600, 245 P.343(1926)"Where the plaintiff 
filed written objections to the report of the medical panel 
and objected to the report at the hearing, the burden was 
on the commission or the employer to sustain it and this 
was not done, the report could not be considered as evidence. 
"Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 
358 P.2d 899 (1961) "Hearsay evidence is admissible in an 
administrative hearing before the commission, however, the 
commission's findings of fact cannot be based exclusively 
on hearsay evidence and there must be as residuum of 
evidence, legal and competent in a court of law, to support 
an award. Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial Comm'n 
832 P2d.477 (Utah Ct. App.1992) 
The commission must look at all relevant evidence in 
Reaching its findings without being restricted to giving 
evidence from specific witnesses more weight than that 
from other witnesses. Rushton v. Gelco Express & Employers 
Mutual Liab., 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986)"A subsequent 
11 
aggi a v at ion c • i "lighting i ip : c rf a previous injury sustained 
while in the employ of >revioii:i t*mph>yei i. t'ompensable 
if it is demonstrated that there was a causal relationship 
between the two. Makoff Co. \ Industrial Commfn, 13 Utah 
2d 22
 F 1P6 r. .. - ; -: , • 4 pre-existing disease or other 
dis! • '':>- •>. ; ; - - detect . <e body, when aggravated 
or lighted ;^ ry cui industrial accident , i s com pensable 
under the act. Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 
Utah 612,244 P. 2d 649 (lnc2) 
The decision < . :•: .^- -.nr i on nearsay 
evidence, an untrue statement ;•:• •. lsel, a lack 
of evidence from the Respondent, and failed to acknowledge 
evidence as submitted by the Petitioner. Petitioners 
asserts titlat this was biased and prejudicial and swayed the 
decision of tlle judge. 
Nature of the case. 
This case is a simple Worker's Compensation case. 
The Petitioner < -, i j u r e d t \ - :i c e
 f w h i 1 e o i I 11 i e p r e m i s e s 
of the employer and while working as d Lidi .-•• ! . f \ . 
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The Petitioner was pulling himself out from under a 
vehicle he was inspecting and experienced a severe and 
unexpected "tearing" to his neck, mid-back and low back. 
The injury was primarily to the right side of the neck 
and low back. This injury was acknowledged and accepted 
by the employer's insurer; Wausau Insurance Company. The 
employee, William Revenef did seek treatment from a 
chiropractor. The insurance company did tell the Dr. that 
they would not pay for any additional treatments, 
even though pain still existed. The employee sought pain 
relief through massage therapy. The employee then sought 
help through a Dr. that was recommended by an associate. 
Dr. Chung was a neurologist. He prescribed some muscle 
relaxers and OTC NSAIDS (over-the-counter-non-steroidal 
anti-inflammatory drugs) along with a course of physical 
therapy. A TENS unit (electro-muscular stimulations) was 
prescribed to help with pain relief. Minor relief was 
experienced, however, the NSAID's burned a hole in the 
colon of the employee. The Petitioner repeatedly asked 
for an MRI. The Dr. refused. It was then learned that 
13 
11 ie pi:i ma r ^  occupation of this Dr. was as a consultant 
or I ME (11 1 d e p e n d e n 1: rn e d j c a 1 e x a m i i I e r ) f o :i : :i i I s i i r a i I c e c omp a n i e s . 
He was not working in the best interests of the Petitioner 
and was fired. 
The Petitioner sought relief from back and neck 
p a i n f r o m a r I o 11 i. e r c 1 i i i: o p r a c t o i \ i1 I o i I o t i c e d a r I a r r o w i n g 
of the cervical vertebrae at tlle C-5-6-7 area. This 
treatment again provided temporary relief from pain. 
The Petitioner was then referred to another neurologist 
1: y a j: -rev :i oi isJ y treat:i i Ig physician ^ ^ n-r , treated with a 
variety or muscle relaxers, an ; •••'.• • .• : • • /sical 
therapy. This again provided minor relief. This Dr. ordered 
an MRI and found narrowing of the cervical vertebrae 
aI tlle C-5-6-7 area of the neck. Lortab pain medication 
was a 1 so pres c r i b e d because the pai i I w a s beco rn j i I g u i I b e a r a. b 1 e 
and incapacitating at times. Dr. Dall noted XAif anyone 
would benefit from surgery, it would be Bill," but he 
did not recommend it. The petitioner was then referred 
to a nei ] ro-si i rgeoi I for a seen ••.: * Robert n^^a 
perf ormed surgery wit 1 :i i n 2 weeks after the coi Isi 111at i oi I . 
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The disc between C5-6 was removed and the vertebrae fused. 
Pain relief in the neck was instantaneous. 
During this period, the Insurance Carrier, 
Wausau Insurance did not dispute the findings or the injury. 
They did however, refuse to pay for any treatment after 
the firing of Dr. Chung. They had accepted liability and 
told the Petitioner that they would continue to pay for 
treatment as long as it was related to the original injury. 
They did not pay anything, and left the petitioner with 
an unpaid bill from the TENS unit provider. 
a. Course of Proceedings. 
The Petitioner filed for a hearing with the Labor 
Commission. The Petitioner sent a complete copy of medical 
records to the Judge. One of the employees in the Labor 
Commission called and told the Petitioner that the judge 
did not want and would not look at the records and to 
pick them up. 
During this procedure, the petitioner cited the 
case history, showing that the injury remained constant 
and progressive and treatment was all conservative in 
15 
i lature ai id provided only minor pain relief. The statement 
alsu Mif'lndi'J UK-* cnmments . " ' f anyone 
would benefit from surgery, it would be B:i ] ] , bu t 1 d DI 1' t 
recommend it." 
The Respondent presented their commissioned report 
from reguLjii, does reports for insurance 
companies, AU ubjec ! * - ;* ^aised by the Petitioi ie:i : 
citing ""hearsay evidence" and the lack of opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness. The judge stated that it 
was too costly and time consuming for such things. 
The Respondent failed In .show •• . < . )n<^ r 
had a pre-existing condition, even thougn uidL 
not matter as shown by citations above. The Respondent 
made an untrue statement to the judge, •" his brief, that 
the Petitioner 1 iad fi ] ed ai io 11 i er Worker;s Compensation 
Claim for neck and back injuries subsequent 
at issue. The counselor knew this to be untrue and 
did not amend his brief. 
tement of Procedings,Disposition at Agency. 
The juctep found • )z r n e *>. .* > stati i lg tl lat 
16 
the first part of treatment was covered, the middle part 
was not covered, and that should surgery be needed, 
the Petitioner could submit for review of that part of 
the claim. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
1. The petitioner was injured on the job. 
2. The Worker's Comp Insurance carrier, Wausau Insurance 
company did accept liability for the injury. 
3. The carrier did pay for the initial treatment of the 
injury. 
4.The carrier did state that they would pay for treat-
ment as long as it was related to the original injury. 
This was by way of phone conversations, mail and email. 
5. The carrier then quit paying for treatment. 
6. The employee did everything that the Doctors suggested 
and prescribed, with only temporary relief from pain. 
The employee finally had a Dr. that thought the injury 
was serious enough to perform surgery within 2 weeks 
of the initial consultation. 
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• .! ce carrier and tlle counsel for them have 
d e m o n s t r a t e d s 1 1 o d d y a r 1 d i 11 1 f a :i i : c J a i i n s p i: a c t :i c e s . 
throughout this ordeal. By not upholding their 
obligation as prescribed by law and by their own 
statements, they have placed a physical, emotional 
d u e l I i ridiif' i n \ h a r c h i h i p M M 1 I MI > I v l i tioner. Opposing 
Counsel, by making untrue statements as <M officer 
of the court, has perpetuated that practice. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT-DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT 
lionej !:,,,: joeen victimized K> I i:e treatment 
o f t h e ' • . -• • : ' M » .; • \ ; t ;. * : .. -. 
their handling of this cla l l u . J. ij.<w y have intentionally 
caused harm to the employee. 
During the period from the date of the injury and 
reporl . .-.• r the claim, the Petitioner has ,s< night, ^unserve-
ative relief from the injury, has not requested drugs, has 
not been a malingerer and has tried to carry on a normal 
life, in spite of chronic pain caused by this injury. The 
medica ] advi ce di i i::i i ig this period ma . : • .- v- A . )ppn 
the best, but 11 ie petitioner d i d foliow :i ns11:i ic 1:i ons . 
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The Insurance Carrier did cease paying for treatment 
although the complaint during this 10 year period has been 
the same. Any and all medical records requested by the 
carrier or their counsel have been provided willingly. The 
Insurance carrier has failed to show that the injury claimed 
was not from the date of the accident. They have failed to 
show any intervening incidents to aggravate the injury. 
They have failed to show any pre-existing condition contri-
buted to the injury although citations provided herein 
show that would be irrelevant anyway. 
The insurance carrier has shown bad-faith in handling 
this claim since the Petitioner fired Dr. Chung for 
not looking out for the patient. 
The Petitioner has provided records to show that this 
injury caused deterioration in the condition of the 
Petitioner. 
The Petitioner needed surgery for one of the affected 
areas (cervical fusion) and has completed surgery and 
is still in recovery. 
The judge in this case erred by accepting hearsay 
19 
evidence which unfairly biased the case against the 
petitioner. The judge accepted the word of the counsel 
for the carrier, in which he made an untrue statement. 
The judge interpreted the statement of Dr. Dall that 
"if anyone would benefit from surgery, it would be Bill, 
but I don't recommend it." The judge interpreted this 
statement to mean that surgery wasn't needed, although 
the Dr. clearly stated that it would be beneficial. 
CONCLUSION-PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The Petitioner does pray that this court will 
overturn the decision of Judge Traynor and find for 
the Petitioner. The evidence submitted by the opposing 
counsel was unsubstantiated and violated due process. 
The Petitioner prays that all expenses for medical 
treatment, medications and therapy that are un-reimbursed 
be paid to the Petitioner. The Petitioner has several 
thousands of dollars of out of pocket expenses incurred 
as a result of the injury sustained at work. The insurer 
accepted liability, they just don't want to pay. 
The Petitioner prays that future treatments, 
20 
medications and procedures that are related to this 
injury are compensated by the insurance carrier. 
A complete billing and treatment history will be 
presented upon finding for the Petitioner. The treatment 
history is already in the possession of the carrier/ 
opposing counsel, with the exception of the surgical 
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